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There is a tension in the British constitution, and it concerns the role of the 
monarchy in political affairs. On the one hand, the monarch is expected to be 
politically neutral. On the other hand, the monarch is entitled to be politically active; 
she is permitted to express her political opinions in confidence to the elected 
government. Can this tension be resolved? Should it be resolved? This essay will 
explore both of these questions. The aim is not to try to settle these questions once 
and for all, but rather to think about how we might develop responsible arguments 
for the main answers that could be offered. 
These issues have been made vivid by the disclosure, in the summer of 2015, 
of the Prince of Wales’ so-called “advocacy” correspondence to the government. 
Although the Prince of Wales is the heir to the throne, one day he will be King. It is 
fair to say that the disclosure of his correspondence has intensified the public debate 
about the monarchy’s role in British political life. 
A final clarification. Throughout this essay I will refer to “political” opinions 
or “political” matters. By this I do not simply mean matters of party politics. A 
question may be party political one day but not the next. It is not easy to draw a firm 
boundary between political and non-political matters, but for our purposes the 
former includes both matters of party politics and those concerning the governance 
of the state in general. 
 
The tension 
 
I began by suggesting that there is a tension concerning the monarchy’s role in 
politics. It would be helpful to say more about what this tension is. 
The constitution expects that the monarch is both politically neutral and 
politically active. Let us take neutrality first. Claims about the monarch’s political 
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neutrality have been advanced by the government in cases before English courts and 
tribunals.1 The claims abound in official publications as well;2 one such claim is that it 
would be unconstitutional (although not unlawful) for the monarch to vote in 
general or local elections.3 
But the constitution also seems to assume that the monarch is not politically 
neutral. According to a constitutional convention that has been called the “tripartite 
convention”, the monarch is entitled to be consulted, to encourage and to warn her 
government.4 One forum in which this may take place is during her weekly audience 
with the Prime Minister.5 
So is there a tension here? The answer may seem obvious, but we should 
look more closely to make sure. In particular, we should ask ourselves what political 
neutrality even requires, at least in this context. It cannot mean that the monarch is 
forbidden from holding political opinions; it cannot purport to regulate what she 
thinks. Rather, it must be concerned with the monarch’s acting on her political 
opinions. 
Our constitutional settlement certainly aims to prevent the monarch from 
wielding political power on the basis of her political opinions. Governing is left to 
the elected government – hence, for instance, the so-called “cardinal convention” 
according to which the monarch exercises her prerogative powers on the advice of 
her government. It also seems that neutrality in this context requires that the 
monarch refrain from acting on political opinions in the sense of voicing them in 
public or official settings. 
 In light of all this, one way to locate the tension is as follows. It is public 
knowledge that the monarch holds a weekly audience with the Prime Minister at 
which she is entitled to express her political opinions (as per the tripartite 
convention). The content of the meetings, however, is secret. By contrast, even 
																																								 																				
1 E.g., Evans v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC) (Upper Tribunal) at paras 54, 59 and 
62. 
2 The claim may be found on the official website of the British Monarchy; see 
<http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/HowtheMonarchyworks/Whatisconstitutionalmonarchy.as
px> accessed 31 March 2016. 
3 E.g., <http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandGovernment/Queenandvoting.aspx> 
accessed 31 March 2016. 
4 Confusingly, the convention is sometimes described as the monarch’s right and duty to be consulted, 
to encourage and to warn. As regards consultation, the monarch’s right to be consulted (if understood 
as a Hohfeldian claim-right) means that the government is under a corresponding duty to consult with 
the monarch; in this sense, the right to be consulted might sometimes be framed both as a right (for 
the monarch) and a duty (for the government). However, there is a difference between the monarch’s 
having a right to encourage or to warn (understood here as a permission to encourage or to warn), 
and the monarch’s having a duty to encourage or to warn. It is unclear whether the convention does 
extend to the latter. Nonetheless, we do not need to settle this here; for our purposes (namely, 
demonstrating that the constitution assumes that the monarch is politically active), it is enough that 
the monarch is constitutionally permitted to encourage and to warn. 
5 The monarchy’s official website states: “Although she is a constitutional monarch who remains 
politically neutral, The Queen retains the ability to give a regular audience to a Prime Minister … at 
which she has a right and a duty to express her views on Government matters ... These meetings … 
remain strictly confidential. Having expressed her views, The Queen abides by the advice of her 
ministers” 
<http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandGovernment/QueenandPrimeMinister.aspx> 
accessed 31 March 2016. 
	 3 
though voting is by way of a secret ballot, the monarch publicly refuses to vote, the 
reason being that she “must remain politically neutral”.6 This occasion of acting on 
political opinion is thought to be unacceptable – despite the fact that it is also 
protected by secrecy. In both cases the monarch will be acting on her political 
opinions and seeking to make a difference politically.7 Both activities are secret. Yet 
one is permissible and the other is not. 
 
Can the tension be resolved? 
 
It seems, then, that the constitution expects the monarch to be both politically 
neutral and politically active. Can this tension be resolved? 
Republican arguments call for the abolition of the monarchy, and this would 
be one way to solve things – namely, by removing the nucleus around which the 
tension materialises. But the prospects for abolition are not good, at least for the 
foreseeable future. On the assumption that the monarchy is here to stay, we should 
think about how we might resolve the tension in a way that reflects our considered 
judgments about the monarchy’s proper role in political affairs. 
 Two solutions suggest themselves. According to the first, the monarch 
should be politically neutral, and the constitution should therefore expect that she 
withdraw from politics more fully.8 According to the second solution, the monarch 
ought to let go of the claim to political neutrality and should instead be public about 
her political activity (which should aspire, as ever, to be responsible). I will address 
each of these solutions in turn. The aim is not to determine which is better, but 
rather to draw out and reflect on some of the considerations in favour of either 
solution. 
 Let us turn to the first possible solution. The idea here is that the political 
neutrality of the monarchy is essential and that the constitutional entitlement of the 
monarch to be politically active should tend to give way. On this approach, the 
tripartite convention – the monarch’s right to be consulted, to encourage and to 
warn – could be abolished. Equally, we might say, the weekly audiences with the 
Prime Minister should cease. 
 If these steps were taken, the political activity of the monarchy could be 
reduced. The monarch would continue in her role as Head of State, standing above 
the political fray and, for that reason (among others), well placed to represent all the 
																																								 																				
6 <http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandGovernment/Queenandvoting.aspx> accessed 
31 March 2016. 
7 It should be noted that the weekly audience also makes it possible for a monarch to have political 
influence even where she does not seek to do so. One person can of course influence another without 
seeking to do so (or without seeking to do so in that particular way). 
8 Absolute political neutrality may be impossible. The monarchy may be taken to support its own 
continued existence, and whether we should have a monarchy is of course a politically charged 
question. (See further n 11 below.) In addition, situations may arise where, for instance, the monarch 
must act alone in exercising her prerogative powers rather than on the advice of ministers. Hence the 
modesty of this first solution which calls for the monarch to withdraw more fully from politics. I will at 
times in this essay speak about “resolving” the tension, but such statements should be read with this 
qualification in mind. It is also worth adding that none of this means that the task here is futile. The 
aim of the first solution is to further the monarch’s political neutrality and thereby minimise the 
specified tension, and this is certainly feasible. 
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peoples of her nation. For those who support the monarchy, these are valuable aims, 
and perhaps better served by reducing the monarchy’s role in political affairs further. 
One may think that, while there may be shortcomings (as far as political 
neutrality goes) with the tripartite convention and the weekly audience, the benefits 
outweigh the costs. But what are the benefits? Those who are sceptical will question 
why another voice is necessary in an already congested political arena. Indeed, one 
worry is that the monarch is not merely one voice among others; she has access to 
government in ways that the ordinary citizen does not. Furthermore, her 
involvement in politics consumes government resources. The government 
corresponds with the monarch regularly in order to keep her informed about 
developments, and this may form the basis of discussions in the weekly audience, 
itself a draw on the Prime Minister’s time. 
The most fundamental question, however, is this. At base, is the quality of 
government improved by the monarch’s exercise of her consultation right, or her 
rights to encourage and to warn? (I am assuming here that these rights are being 
used.) For the sceptic, it is hard to know that governmental decision-making would 
be worse without the monarch’s involvement. While a great deal of political debate is 
sensational rather than sober, there is no guarantee that the monarch’s contribution 
will be one rather than the other. There is no certainty that the monarch will be a 
careful and beneficent influence on government. The principle of hereditary 
succession in our monarchy means that whoever sits on the throne depends on a 
natural lottery. 
Any claim that monarchy necessarily has a beneficial impact on government 
is therefore a strong one, and difficult to verify. The implication is that political 
systems lacking a monarchy of this sort are – all other things being equal – worse off, in 
terms of the quality of governmental decision-making, than political systems with 
such a monarchy. 
But what if it is sometimes true that monarchy improves the quality of 
government? This is no good, the sceptic will insist, because too much is left open. It 
might mean that on rare occasions the impact is beneficial, but mostly it is not – 
hardly a glowing recommendation. The response might be that this is unlikely, or 
that monarchical involvement is beneficial more often than not. Such responses, 
however, would still need to overcome challenging probative hurdles. Demonstrating 
beneficial impact will generally be tough given that a veil of secrecy shrouds the 
monarch’s political activity. While ex-Prime Ministers may extoll the helpfulness of 
the weekly audience,9 it would be preferable if we could reach our own assessment. 
 If this first solution were adopted, one additional worry might be that the 
strictures of political neutrality could impose a greater cost on each individual 
monarch. For instance, on a sympathetic reading of the Prince of Wales’ advocacy 
correspondence, it is understandable that he cannot help but speak his mind if he 
believes that there is call for it. The nature of his office means that he meets many 
people, and it is proper and humane that he wish at times to voice his genuine 
concerns about matters that come to his attention. Although the Prince of Wales is 
the heir, these points would apply with just as much force to the monarch. 
Nonetheless, sympathy will be in short supply among those who take the first 
																																								 																				
9 See, e.g., Evans (Upper Tribunal), para 80 where the tribunal referred to Rodney Brazier’s witness 
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solution seriously. One cannot have one’s cake and eat it, they would say. The 
rigours of the monarch’s political neutrality serve important constitutional ends of 
their own; and if a monarch finds these unpalatable there is always abdication. King 
Edward VIII’s abdication in 1936 in order to marry the American socialite, Wallis 
Simpson, is a well known precedent. Giving up the throne for love might capture the 
imagination more than abdicating in order to voice concerns publicly about 
legislative proposals or planning decisions. But the point is that there is a way out. 
So this is the first solution. It calls for the monarch’s role in political affairs to 
be minimised by doing away with the tripartite convention and the weekly audience. 
And it shores up the monarch’s claim to political neutrality. 
 The second solution is to let go of that claim. This is not to say that the 
monarch should govern; that remains the preserve of the elected government. It 
means, simply, that no claim to political neutrality is advanced – and instead the 
monarch publicly acknowledges her political activity. It would, on this view, remain 
possible for the content of at least some of her political contributions to be 
confidential. She would nonetheless be open about making political contributions in 
the first place. This sort of approach is not wholly unprecedented. For example, the 
official description of the Belgian monarchy’s role publicly acknowledges the 
“political action” of the King of Belgium, whose (confidential) meetings with 
political and other leaders are candidly depicted as providing “a precious source of 
information for [the King] and a means of allowing him to exert his influence”.10 
 The second solution would also permit the monarch to make non-
confidential contributions to political discussions. Either way, the monarch’s 
contributions need not be party political. We tend to recognise the presence in civil 
society of organisations which can make political contributions (confidential or 
otherwise) while eschewing – or being perceived as eschewing – party politics. 
Examples might include the Institute for Fiscal Studies or professional bodies such 
as the British Medical Association. The second solution permits cautious, well-judged 
interventions which would, at present, be publicly disapproved given the concern for 
political neutrality. It is frequently said of Queen Elizabeth II that she has accrued 
vast political experience – twelve British Prime Ministers and counting. Might there 
not be circumstances when such experience could be put to good, sensible use in 
political discussions? She would also be free to refrain from political interventions if 
she wishes, as would be the case with any other monarch. 
Moreover, for all the worry about neutrality and the perceived benefit of 
being able to stand outside the political fray, we know that the monarch cannot but 
hold political opinions and that these may differ from our own. There is, at present, 
merely a constraint on expressing such opinions publicly. Indeed, there is one big, 
controversial political question on which the monarch is (publicly) not neutral: the 
question whether we should have a monarchy as opposed to a republic.11 We know 
																																								 																				
10 <https://www.monarchie.be/en/monarchy/royal-office> accessed 31 March 2016. 
11 This may be queried in the following way. Just as it may be possible to have an anarchist judge – a 
judge who takes his oath of office seriously and applies the law, all the while harbouring a secret 
commitment to philosophical anarchism and preferring the end of the state – it may be possible to 
have a monarch with republican beliefs. Or the monarch may simply be undecided about whether to 
retain or abolish the monarchy. These would, I think, be more marginal cases. Furthermore, regardless 
of any personally held beliefs, the monarch publicly acts so as to uphold the monarchy, which is 
precisely what stands against neutrality. 
	 6 
all this, and yet it is still claimed by many writers that the monarch is able to represent 
all the peoples of the nation.12 (Would this include those who are of republican 
inclination as well?13) If that claim continues to be advanced, in spite of all that we 
already know, we might ask why the avowed freedom to make even occasional, 
modest contributions to political debate would be constitutionally menacing. 
 Perhaps a different worry might be raised, and it centres on the arbitrariness 
of hereditary succession. Whoever is born into the monarchy depends on a natural 
lottery. Since monarchs do not earn their position, we have no guarantee about the 
merit of their political contributions (whether confidential or otherwise). The 
concern is more acute because their potential influence is great; a monarch’s access 
to the government, including the Prime Minister, is considerable and she has an 
established platform. Given this worry there may be hesitation about publicly 
admitting even modest political activity on her part. 
 The worry may, however, be exaggerated. The Prime Minister could have a 
sibling with whom he is close and in whom he confides regularly, including on 
political matters. The sibling’s privileged level of access to the person who happens 
to have become the Head of Government is also the outcome of a natural lottery. 
One might claim that the sibling does not, at least, have access to the whole 
government in the way that the monarch does; but this cannot be the gist of the 
complaint, for critics would continue to protest even if the monarch had access to 
the Prime Minister only. Should the constitution require that the Prime Minister 
consult with, or confide in, only those who are thought to have earned or in some 
way “merited” their access? This does not seem sensible. Furthermore, it may rather 
limit the range of voices and interests to which the Prime Minister may be exposed. 
 In light of all this, proponents of this second solution – that the monarchy 
should no longer worry about the strictures of neutrality and should instead become 
more publicly political (in the way that has been suggested) – will argue that it poses 
no great constitutional threat. The monarch is, after all, already entitled to make 
political interventions in secret. And in the end the government can always choose 
whether to pay attention. That is the ultimate corrective. 
These are the two solutions that I have canvassed: first, the monarchy should 
become less politically active and more ceremonial, and second, the monarchy 
should become more publicly political. The second solution – calling for the 
monarchy to give up its claim to political neutrality – will seem more odd to many 
eyes, and more difficult to justify. Nonetheless, the aim has been to develop a 
responsible set of arguments for both solutions. 
 
Should the tension be resolved? 
 
																																								 																				
12 E.g., V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
13 By way of comparison we might mention, for instance, the rule prohibiting Catholics from 
ascending to the throne under the Act of Settlement (1700). Interestingly, Bogdanor describes that 
prohibition as “deeply offensive to Catholics, not only in Britain, but also in those Commonwealth 
countries with large Catholic populations such as Canada and Australia”, and calls for it to be 
abolished; see Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p.59. The Succession to the Crown Act 2013 
does not repeal this rule. 
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Another approach, however, is not to seek to resolve the tension. Instead, we could 
allow the tension to persist by leaving things the way they are. Should a solution even 
be attempted? Again, the aim is not to promote one answer over another, but rather 
to consider different sides of the debate and reflect on how a responsible case might 
be made for each. 
 One response is to say that the tension should indeed be resolved because 
the existing state of affairs is unsatisfactory. To be clear, the mere fact that there is a 
tension need not in itself be the crux of the complaint. Inconsistencies between 
constitutional rules are unavoidable, and while courts or other actors may at times be 
required to resolve them, constitutions make do – and must make do – with 
continuing tensions. 
 The real worry, one might argue, is that the tension is papered over with a 
kind of constitutional dishonesty. Many of us know, as does the monarch, that she is 
politically active. The tripartite convention and the weekly audience put this beyond 
doubt. So the claim that she is politically neutral cannot be a mistake or an oversight. 
It is nothing other than dishonest, and that should worry us in a way that certain 
other constitutional tensions do not. There are other constitutional tensions that 
emerge accidentally. Even where they are not (entirely) accidental, it may not be that 
they are designed to convey a known falsehood to the public at large. That is the case 
with the monarchy’s claim to political neutrality. This is thought to enable the 
monarch to stand for the whole nation. But there is a (known) tension that means 
that the claim rings hollow. 
 Furthermore, it may be argued that resolving the tension need not be 
especially difficult or unpalatable. This takes us back to the earlier discussion of two 
possible solutions to the tension. One solution called for the monarchy to let go of 
the claim to neutrality and instead be more publicly political. It is true that many will 
regard this as inappropriate. On the other hand, the other solution that we 
considered – that the monarchy should withdraw from politics more fully – is visibly 
modest in its proposed reorientation of the monarchy’s relationship with the 
government. It would mean doing away with the tripartite convention and the weekly 
audience in the service of political neutrality. The ease with which this could be 
achieved tells in its favour. 
 So these are possible reasons why we ought to resolve the tension. But we 
must also consider the alternative view that the tension should not be resolved. I will 
focus on one main line of argument which, in my view, may hold greater promise. 
(Whether it is in fact promising is left open.) 
 Earlier, the monarchy’s claim to political neutrality was characterised as 
dishonest. A more charitable description, however, would be say that it is a fiction. 
There are many fictions in the law, and they are not all meritless. This particular 
fiction is maintained in part by secrecy; the claim to neutrality depends on the 
monarch’s political activity (during the weekly audience, for instance) being hidden 
from view. 
 As the argument would run, this fiction is not bereft of value. But we would 
need a clear account of where the value lies. Many of the reasons that are given for 
the value of political neutrality, or for the value of the tripartite convention and the 
weekly audience, will not quite do here. We need a reason that stands for both 
simultaneously. For instance, it is not enough to claim that government benefits from 
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having a safe space for frank conversations. This would be a reason for retaining the 
tripartite convention and the weekly audience. It is not a reason to allow the tension 
to persist. 
 So the task before us is as follows. We need to demonstrate that there is 
something valuable in having a person, the monarch, with whom the Prime Minister 
can have confidential political conversations – while, at the same time, keeping up the 
fiction that the monarch is politically neutral. Of course, this assumes that there is 
already value in both the monarch’s claim to political neutrality and her political 
activity. What is required, though, is an account of the conjunction of the two in 
order to understand why we need both, and therefore why the tension should not be 
resolved (by preferring one over the other). 
 One possible account runs as follows. There is something special about the 
Prime Minister’s being able to speak to, and confide in, the monarch at the weekly 
audience. The Prime Minister has many advisers (whether elected or not) on whom 
he can call. Advisers are usually people of one’s choosing. By contrast, the monarch 
is not chosen by the Prime Minister. She is someone to whom the Prime Minister 
must speak, and repeated meetings build confidence and trust. In addition, the 
monarch purports to speak for the nation as a whole, and this in itself distinguishes 
her from other figures – the Prime Minister’s advisers, business leaders, or significant 
public figures in other fields – on whom the Prime Minister may call. (Purporting to 
stand for the nation as a whole is of course distinct from actually doing so.) 
It may be quite rare in our political system to have a figure like this – 
someone who has a large number of public engagements,14 claims to represent the 
whole nation, and has no (overt) party political agenda. Much of what I have just said 
may be thought to support a resolution of the tension – that is, by having the 
monarch become more overtly political while letting go of the claim of political 
neutrality. But this is not the case. It is the monarch’s very claim to political neutrality 
that makes her well placed to be the figure that we have just described. That claim 
allows her to present herself as representing the nation as a whole. Making good on 
the claim does not matter a great deal (for these purposes); it is the claim itself that is 
distinctive. This, coupled with the fact that she is not chosen by the Prime Minister 
as well as the experience of public engagement that comes with her office, means 
that the weekly audience is a political space that stands apart from others. And it is 
only made possible by a constitutional fiction. 
 So the argument is that the tension should not be resolved (and that the 
secrecy that papers over the tension is therefore useful). It is worth reiterating that 
this argument rests on the assumption that there is already value in both the 
monarchy’s claim to political neutrality and the monarchy’s political activity. This 
makes the argument a rather challenging one to defend. Sceptics will (amongst their 
array of attacks) continue to throw doubt on those underpinnings in order to 
																																								 																				
14 The monarchy’s official website states: “By means of regular visits through every part of the United 
Kingdom, The Queen is able to act as a focus for national unity and identity. Through her 
engagements and walkabouts, The Queen is able to meet people from every walk of life” 
<http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/HowtheMonarchyworks/TheroleoftheSovereign.aspx> 
accessed 31 March 2016. Still, we may ask: Who does the monarch meet? And what kinds of concerns 
(if any) do members of the public bring to her attention? The daily Court Circular which records the 
official engagements of the Royal Family provides partial answers to these questions. 
	 9 
undermine the argument as a whole – for instance, by asking whether there really is 
value in the monarchy’s political activity. Nonetheless, the goal here has been to 
sketch a method for arguing that the tension should not be resolved. Whether it is 
persuasive, all things considered, remains to be seen. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I have raised a number of questions about the monarchy’s role in political affairs. 
The aim has not been to offer definitive answers to these questions, but rather to 
reflect on how we might develop arguments for the different answers that may be 
offered. These issues are not going away. There is heightened interest in light of the 
disclosure of the Prince of Wales’ advocacy correspondence, and the questions are 
likely to continue once he ascends to the throne. In an interview in Vanity Fair, the 
Prince of Wales has admitted that he sees the role of the monarch “[perhaps] in a 
different way than [his] predecessors saw it, because the situation has changed”.15 
More thought is being given to the monarchy’s role in politics, including from the 
heir to the throne, and this essay seeks to join in that conversation. 
 
																																								 																				
15 <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2010/11/prince-charles-201011> accessed 31 March 2016. 
